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العنوان
Risk allocation in public private partnership projects using game theory /
المؤلف
Mostafa, Fatma Mostafa El-Said.
هيئة الاعداد
باحث / فاطمة مصطفى السعيد
مشرف / عماد البلتاجي
مشرف / إسلام المسعودي
مشرف / محمد عيد
الموضوع
Partnership projects.
تاريخ النشر
2022.
عدد الصفحات
online resource (102 pages) :
اللغة
الإنجليزية
الدرجة
ماجستير
التخصص
الهندسة (متفرقات)
تاريخ الإجازة
1/1/2022
مكان الإجازة
جامعة المنصورة - كلية الهندسة - قسم الهندسة الانشائية
الفهرس
Only 14 pages are availabe for public view

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from 102

Abstract

In light of the current political and economic conditions in Egypt, public-private partnership projects (P3s) appear as an effective solution to help the public sector improve its infrastructure, utilities, and services using the technical skills and capabilities of the private partner. Although P3s are used all over the world, they can have particular importance in developing countries that seek a quick and effective solution to improve their projects. Accordingly, P3s have started to be used in Egypt, and there are several projects under study for future implementation. A proper risk allocation and a suitable contract are the two key success factors for P3s so that the risks are adequately covered and properly allocated to the party who is best to handle them. The objective of this study is to construct a general risk allocation module for Design-Build Finance Operate (DBFO) contracts, using cooperative game theory via Shapley value to fairly divide the P3 risks of participating parties. In this research, the top 35 risk factors that affect P3s are identified and classified throughout the life cycle of P3s, from the literature review, and included in a questionnaire which is distributed among industrial experts (130 experts) who worked internationally and in the Egyptian market to determine the allocation preference. The results of the survey ensured that seven risks are to be shared between public and private. Then, the expected ability of each sector to control the impact of the shared risk factors is determined through structured interviews in both the construction and operation phases. Also, risk divisions among P3 parties are generated via Shapley value based on the marginal contribution of each stakeholder. Finally, the stability of the risk allocation shares is validated via structured interviews to evaluate the acceptability of the proposed approach by construction industry practitioners and professionals. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by presenting a fair methodology for risk allocation among collaborating parties in a P3 project. This approach can be utilized in other engineering domains as well. The proposed model enables firms to establish a fair P3 agreement, which satisfies the rationality constraint for each party. For future work, the author recommends replicating the proposed approach to other case studies to have a thorough understanding of fairly sharing risk factors in P3s.