الفهرس | Only 14 pages are availabe for public view |
Abstract This research aims to investigate the association between ownership concentration, information asymmetry and voluntary disclosure. It extends the prior literature in various ways. It analyzes the influence of ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism through classifying the concentrated ownership structures into two mutually exclusive classes; management controlled, institutional controlled ownership structure based on the identity of large blockholders and examine the impact of each class on information asymmetry. This research further investigates the impact of voluntary disclosure as a tool suggested by the literature to mitigate information asymmetry among controlling and minority investors in concentrated ownership structure. Based on a sample of the most actively traded companies listed on the Egyptian stock exchange over the period (2009-2013), the empirical results show that although ownership concentration in general is significantly positively associated with bid ask spread (proxy of information asymmetry) which indicates that ownership concentration increases information asymmetry, the identity of large blockholders has no significant impact on information asymmetry. The results also demonstrate that taking voluntary disclosure into considerations significantly attenuates information asymmetry risk associated with ownership concentration. The findings highlight the importance of corporate disclosures under concentrated ownership structures. Keywords: Ownership Concentration, Voluntary Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Governance, Agency Problems |